Chapter 113
 
 
凱子國-台灣


 

  聯合國對於戰後的國家,於秩序失控後,可其輔導與強行介入的原則,它在KOSOVO(科索夫)、SOMALIA(索馬利亞)、SIERRA LEONE (獅子山塞拉利昇共和國)、EAST TIMOR (東帝汶)、CAMBODIA (柬埔寨)皆其強行以國際規則介入其國內無政府殺戮的大動作。

  在台灣,已是成熟民主轉型的國家,是全世界各國欽羨與讚嘆的焦點,也是國際華人共同驕傲的民主淨土,亦是在中共文攻武嚇之下與台灣國內威權挾殺中,能突危的唯一民主國。

  全世界各國看到台灣的經濟成長,亦了解台灣民主轉型的和平,而現在國際的遊戲規則,亦以台灣為經驗,規劃其世界民主化的最終理想。

  中共要以武力攻打台灣,而美其名為“一中原則”,則逐漸成為自我陶醉的夢想了。

  於2001年12月17日的NEWSWEEK就討論到“承諾與危害”的國際介入他國民主轉型之例,我在這堨[以評述:

  在第二次世界大戰前歐美殖民時代,於戰後透過國際的介入,產生許多獨立的國家,於冷戰時代結束之後,現在用國際外交勢力來整頓政府渙散的國家,亦有不少新興獨立國出現,而聯合國系統的監護,就是一種可以採用的方法,但是其結果與成效如何,就要加以觀察了。

  聯合國之介入新興獨立國,成立新政府,其方法依此NEWSWEEK文章所述,可以歸納出它的步驟,其之有軌可循,亦是由經驗傳承而來,到現在為止,尚為國際接受。

  由於新獨立國家的成立皆是由人權思想而產生,而各一國之內,各種族之間的不相容與公平對待,則是重要因素。而各種不同宗教派系的信仰分裂也會有發酵的作用,政治思想取向不同的群體,也會造成不可收拾的割裂。故避免分裂的本錢乃在於公平、公正、公開、民主、自由、多黨的人權政體。國際介入仲裁到監督民主獨立國的規劃,並非要一個主權國家的分裂,而是在人民自覺自決的大原則下,以客觀監視到無法容忍的種族自殘之時,才會派維和部隊進軍管控。

  聯合國以尊重自決、和平管控為先決條件:

  1. 內戰國皆有其國際野心政權支援,這種無法充份事前防範的工作,只能提出警告。

  2. 不同目的,國際聯盟皆必須在該內亂國動亂之時,取得自制。

  3. 戰爭時的人民受害會越來越嚴重,故人道的考量列為優先。

  4. 人道援助依情狀酌派維和部隊保護。

  5. 於雙方交戰越演越烈之下,維和武裝部隊適時加入干預。

  6. 國際調停產生臨時政府。

  7. 聯合國督促該臨時政府,做人民自決,強力控管,一人一票的公平選票,產生新政權以穩定國內秩序。

  8. 國際資源的援助在新政府簽約接受“多國”監督,完成戰後重建的工作。

  9. 新的民主獨立國產生後,維和部隊階段任務完成,由無武裝的國際觀察員與非政府組織之人道救濟團體,繼續輔育。

  表面上聯合國的工作,依以上原則應該是非常順暢,可是聯合國雖有章法,卻是不少列強私心作祟,而非民主國家的無理取鬧,常常會延遲仲裁的關鍵時刻,以致於使得內戰無法收拾,人道救濟物資無法進入與維和人員受到殺害。

台灣的處境亦喜亦憂

  於民國56年中共核爆之後,引發民主國家想突破中共外交鐵幕的計畫,美國有了與中共建交的新思惟,而台灣於強大政權介入的掌控下,不理會國際情勢的消受之下,蔣公以個人的意志力堅決主張漢賊不兩立,而拒絕當時友好同盟國“一中一台”、“兩個中國”或“一國兩席”的建議,終於在阿爾巴尼亞的提議下,台灣於1971年退出聯合國,而緊接著放棄十九個台灣在聯合國的重要組織地位,所以說當時的台灣是沒有主權可以言,而於一黨獨大控制之下,台灣只有中華民國的主權,而由軍隊所控制,故自1970年以後,台灣的中華民國主權沒了,而台灣國亦無由產生,反觀中共挾著國際舞台上,擁有中華民國與中華人民共和國的實際發言權,故凡是與台灣中華民國有外交關係的國家,就會在聯合國受中共的打壓,所以台灣的外交,只有凱子外交一途可行。

台灣本土化民主是唯一圖存之道

  蔣公時代控制媒體,台灣人民無法確知國際動向,蔣公一人的意志就是台灣意識,卻想不到此意識形態,造成的台灣主權危機,可是綿綿不絕。圖存之道,在於壯士斷腕,而此時此刻竟然自絕中華民國在台灣的命根子,蔣公之政治智慧,有待歷史公論了。

  當時的台灣,若無蔡同榮發起保台的FAPA組織,由彭明敏、許世楷…許多台灣人教授在美國活動,此所謂之“台灣關係法”,就是“中國台灣關係法”了,其中最重要的一條,就是台灣人自決台灣前途的定案,其原意為台灣前途由中國人自決,果若此法通過台灣如何與12億中國人自決,雖然此台灣關係法為美國國內法,國民黨之不能掌握台灣在聯合國的契機,在於國民黨心中只有中華民國,而不理會所依附的台澎金馬人民的自決,故到頭來,中華民國沒了!也被台灣人民所唾棄!

  以上可知,一中原則是由當時兩大專制政權所建立,亦無絲毫人民自決的權利,要現在的台灣人民接受中共專制統治有相當的困難,若是真的被迫接受,其未來只有大戰一途,所以在中共不肯平等看待台灣主權存在的事實,雙方彈性經貿、文教的互動,則是方便法門。

  故NEWSWEEK在此篇英文報導中,就寫出這些定論,它說之不論聯合國如何干預,其最後結局還在當地人民的自決,而只有其人民的團結,方能完成真正獨立民主國的實現。請參考英文稿。

 

The Promise, the Peril

In 10 years, the United Nations has racked up a checkered history of 'nation-building.' Can it learn from its mistakes?

BY Marcus Mabry
NEWSWEEK 2001/12/17


Dec. 17 issue - How do you build a nation? Leaders have asked that question for literally thousands of years. From Shaka Zulu to Bismarck, military rulers did it by uniting disparate clans through the conquest of land and the cultivation of "national" pride. In colonial times the European and American powers did it through subjugation and might. But since the end of the cold war-and the diplomatic paralysis that it produced-the job of creating nations from failed states has fallen increasingly to the nebulous "international community" through the United Nations.

TO THE UNITED Nations' chagrin, nation-building is still more of an art than a science. The international community failed miserably in Somalia, choosing to cut and run with disastrous results. It succeeded in Mozambique, thanks to the end of the superpower rivalry that had fed the country's civil war-but also to the war weariness of the local people and their leaders' determination to win the peace. Despite the United Nations' mixed record in a decade of nation-building-indeed, because of it-there are lessons that can be applied as the effort to build a new Afghanistan gets underway. If only the United Nations will heed them. These are just five case studies that show what the international community can do, what it must do and what only the Afghans themselves can accomplish.

KOSOVO
LESSON NO. 1: BE THERE. "The best thing we can do for this place is have lunch!" So said some members of the United Nations mission in Kosovo. It sounds like a cynic's joke about the work ethic of international civil servants. But in fact it's true. After two years of fighting, not to mention the forced expulsion of nearly half of its 2 million people, the best thing the international community could do for Kosovo in June 1999 was to simply be there. And they came: a 10,000-odd army of nation builders, NGO volunteers and globalist do-gooders. So that they could go to lunch, Kosovars opened cafes and restaurants. So that they could buy toilet paper and TVs, entrepreneurs opened shops and businesses. That in turn generated incomes and helped people rebuild their houses, two thirds of which had been destroyed in the war. A majority of Kosovars got a fresh start on life.
Call it context. The United Nations arrived in chaos and brought with it an all-important semblance (which is not to say the reality) of order. A 40,000-strong contingent of NATO troops provided security-halting most of the revenge killing among Serbs and Albanians, and, no less important, reining in the former warlords of the Kosovo Liberation Army who otherwise would have hijacked the territory for their own reward. U.N. internationals took over the administration of municipal governments, schools and public works. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mounted an ambitious program of democratization, culminating in last month's elections that created a quasinational Parliament, presidency and Constitution. The UNHCR, World Food Program and International Red Cross brought in food and tents to tide the homeless through their first winter. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development poured in hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, rebuilding roads, communications and infrastructure.
Despite the United Nations' mixed record in a decade of nation-building-indeed, because of it-there are lessons that can be applied as the effort to build a new Afghanistan gets underway.

When it comes to humanitarian intervention, Kosovo is probably as close to a success as you can get. But it hasn't been easy, and it hasn't been pretty. Nearly two and a half years later, ethnic violence still flares. Electricity, heat and water are sometimes on, sometimes not. The United Nations talks of building the "structures" and "institutions" of civil society in Kosovo, but rarely have such efforts succeeded. There is no legal system. Corruption and crime are epidemic, not only among locals. Municipal government scarcely exists, prompting more than one international to mutter, "These people will never be capable of governing themselves." And no one agrees how to resolve the ultimate question of Kosovo's future-independence, or what?
Yet to visit Pristina, the ever-grubby capital, is nothing less than invigorating. The city teems with small businesses. The place is a construction site, new houses and office buildings going up everywhere-with precious little help from internationals. This is homegrown, grass-roots civic enterprise, a triumph of individualism that sooner or later will knit into community. That is as it should be. It all comes back to "context." Create a framework of security and a basic sense of order, and with time and effort the people will take care of themselves.
-Michael Meyer

SOMALIA
LESSON NO. 2: ISOLATE THE WARLORDS. Every month Musa Sudi Yalahow fires off his guns to "test" them. If the aging Somali warlord could see the effect of his monthly display of force on the people of Mogadishu (not much), he'd stop wasting the ammunition. Five years ago the mere mention of his name sent children scurrying from the streets. His clansmen, the Abgal, fought with legendary cruelty on his behalf. Today his shabby militia shows up for work only when paid. And he's not alone. Last year warlord Osman (Ato) Ali, once able to plunge Mogadishu into chaos with a short bark into his radio transmitter, had every bit of furniture stolen from his house by his own underpaid militia.

The United Nations didn't do it. The strongest military power on earth didn't do it. But 10 years of anarchy and bloodshed have nearly dissolved the bond between the Somali people and the warlords who claim to represent them. "There was a time when the warlords could say, 'Give me 1,000 boys,' and they would be there the next minute," says analyst Yassin Salad. "Today no one would show."
The international community gets none of the credit. It has been a brutal road from war to a fragile peace, and Somalis have walked it alone. After 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed by gunmen loyal to warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid in 1993, the largest military operation ever mounted by the United Nations for humanitarian purposes packed its bags. In the ensuing anarchy, warlords kept Somalia at the bottom rung of development. Today its infant-mortality rate is one of the highest in the world, with one in every four children certain to die before the age of 5. Crime is not only rampant but, in a country where everyone is armed, lethal. Mogadishu is a shell of a city, its ruins shot to bits or looted and sold for scrap.
Somalis are struggling to escape the morass. Last year a gathering of clans finally elected a Parliament and a president, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. When he arrived in Mogadishu in August of 2000, he was met by an ecstatic throng 250,000 strong. But the new government has received no help from the international community. Despite a formal endorsement by the Security Council, which encouraged U.N. member states to work with the transitional government, donors have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. "They've got to show that they can control more than a few blocks in Mogadishu," says a Western diplomat in Nairobi.

But without outside aid, U.N. officials say, that will be impossible. As it is, there's no money to keep a police force on the street, let alone equip and staff ministries or build a civil service and a system of tax collection. "If we don't get some backing from the international community, it will be very difficult to survive," admits Hassan Abshir Farah, the newly appointed prime minister. And that's not a danger just for Somalia. "The world has changed after September 11," says a U.N. official. "It can no longer afford a vacuum like Somalia... in a vacuum anything can flourish."
The world may learn that hard lesson again in Afghanistan-just as it did after the Soviet rout in 1989. American bombing may have defeated the Taliban, but it also led to their replacement with warlords who now control local fiefdoms. Only a unified Afghan government, with international support, can neutralize them.
-Lara Santoro

SIERRA LEONE
LESSON NO. 3: CREATE A PEACE ECONOMY. Sierra Leone finally seems firmly on the road to recovery. The best evidence: some of its most talented citizens, who fled almost a decade of civil war, are bringing capital home. "The economy shows a brighter spark than it has for a long while," says Graham McKinley, a British expat who recently sold his Freetown-based cell-phone company. "A few new restaurants have opened." In the countryside, the United Nations' largest peacekeeping force-UNAMSIL, with 17,500 members-has overseen the demobilization of 37,000 Liberian-backed rebels and pro-government militiamen. The peace has reunited tens of thousands of families. The pillars of state security are on the mend. Importantly, a force of about 150 British officers on long-term assignment advises every Sierra Leonean military official with command responsibility. The cops likewise are under British tutelage.
The problem is, the hardest road still lies ahead. Rebels loyal to outlaw President Charles Taylor of neighboring Liberia still hold Sierra Leone's rich diamond fields. They have pledged to withdraw before elections scheduled for March, but old hands in the region aren't betting on a happy outcome-even if the United Nations moves in there. It is more than a regional problem. Close aides of terror mastermind Osama bin Laden are reported to have raised tens of millions of dollars in recent years after getting access to cheap rebel diamonds through a longtime Taylor crony from neighboring Burkina Faso.
Despite a lot of talk, the international community has failed to clean up the trade in conflict diamonds. The United Nations says illegal diamond sales from Sierra Leone reaped up to $75 million in 1999, and the pace has increased since rebels signed a peace deal last summer. The national treasury sorely needs tax income from these exports. But international negotiators only last month agreed on a plan for international certification of rough-diamond exports and imports. And it's still a wide-open question whether the system will work. Re-establishing a peace economy is a great start, but Sierra Leone will remain at best a state without its most precious resource.
- Tom Masland

EAST TIMOR
LESSON NO. 4: EMPOWER THE LOCALS. East Timor's misery at first looked to have a silver lining. After Indonesian-sponsored militias laid waste to the territory in 1999, much of the population fled into the hills or across the border into West Timor. Australian-led peacekeepers restored order, but many professionals and nearly all the civil servants-who had been appointed by Jakarta-refused to return. The U.N. administrators who came instead seemed to have been presented with a clean slate: a people who were eager for help, buoyed by the world's sympathy and quite unprepared to make decisions about their future.
Or so it seemed. The United Nations quickly learned that an army of international experts and do-gooders could not simply build a new East Timor- using local labor-without inspiring a debilitating resentment. Bureaucratic bungling, ineffective regulations and red tape, and a noticeable arrogance among U.N. staffers toward the Timorese alienated much of the local population. "The recruitment process of hundreds and hundreds of foreign personnel was done in haste, and half of them were really a waste of resources," says Nobel Prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta, the territory's de facto foreign minister. "Many of them had very racist, arrogant, patronizing attitudes." Angry Timorese clashed with U.N. police on several occasions earlier this year to protest heavy-handed tactics by officers on patrol. The first Timorese officials appointed to the United Nations' executive cabinet claimed they were powerless, that the international staff did not heed their views.
The "Timorization" of the nation-building process that the United Nations proceeded to enact-giving local leaders much more authority and decision-making power-is critical for several reasons. The mission's early troubles show how easily even a welcome international presence can come to seem foreign and oppressive. At the same time, bringing the two sides into the same process ensures that local leadership must take some responsibility for the successes or failures of the effort. And at the ground level, no vast civic project can succeed if the population that is governed feels it is not party to the decisions that are made on its behalf. "Related to this is the importance of making sure that the people understand what is going on," says Johanna Kao, resident program director for the International Republican Institute in Dili. "Civic education, or whatever you want to call it, is probably the most underrated activity here." With any luck, the United Nations has learned at least as much as it has taught the Timorese.
- Joe Cochrane

CAMBODIA
LESSON NO. 5: KEEP YOUR PROMISES. The verdict on the United Nations mission in Cambodia is-not coincidentally-as halfhearted as its actions. The country is at peace for the first time in three decades. Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh, once battlefield enemies, have reconciled and formed a new coalition government. There is a functioning national assembly and a fledgling civil society of human-rights groups, aid organizations and democracy think tanks. Foreign aid continues to flow for land-mine clearance, education and health. Yet at the same time, Cambodia continues to suffer from violence, lawlessness, a culture of impunity for the wealthy and powerful, an AIDS epidemic and poverty levels that have scarcely improved since the country began receiving international assistance a decade ago. The place is stable, but its quiet is that of the cowed.

The indecisiveness of the U.N. mission contributed in no small measure to this mixed record. A key provision of the 1991 peace accords signed in Paris required that all sides disarm and demobilize up to 70 percent of their forces. Yet when the Khmer Rouge refused, international peacekeepers-scattered around the country in relatively weak units of Indonesians, Uruguayans, Malaysians, Thais and others-had neither the will nor the means to force it to comply. At times the foreign troops seemed inexplicably terrified of the black-clad Maoist rebels: when the Khmer Rouge closed roads into territory under its control, the blue helmets did not challenge the simple blockades of bamboo sticks. "Without the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge, no one else disarmed," says Kao Kim Hourn, a prominent Cambodian political analyst. "If the U.N. had been prepared to enforce disarmament, it would have used force. There was no will to do so."
That first compromise led to others. The Khmer Rouge boycotted the U.N.-sponsored elections in 1993-the centerpiece of the mission-and dragged out the country's civil war until 1998. Some 90 percent of the populace voted in polls that were generally considered free and fair. But when Ranariddh's funcinpec party won more seats than Hun Sen's CPP, the hard-liner prime minister refused to step down. Ultimately Ranariddh's father, King Norodom Sihanouk, proposed that the two share power as co-prime ministers and divvy up ministries between them. "That should never have been accepted," says Finn Viggo Gunderson, a U.N. election officer at the time. "The U.N. should have faced the confrontation with the CPP when it came."
Instead the United Nations committed perhaps its most fundamental breach of faith: it promised Cambodia democracy, then began pulling out as soon as the election was staged. Hun Sen's people maintained control of all the key military and financial ministries, and in 1997 the strongman overthrew Ranariddh in a bloody coup that left him in firm and unquestioned control of the state. Even today, when the two are ostensible allies, Hun Sen continues to rule Cambodia as a virtual fiefdom. Some say the United Nations could not have prevented such an outcome by enforcing the election results in 1993. But by leaving the country with only the framework of democracy and not the institutions to support it, the world satisfied its own conscience more than Cambodia's needs.
-Joe Cochrane