Chapter154      part2
 
 
中共不可能永久控制中國人-武力霸權的省思

 

  日本感受到Rogue States的祖國-中共來的威脅,正加強國防保安的工作,美國亦希望日本能自保而自立自強,而中共則認為日本在做軍國主義的復辟。但是中共的無限擴軍,可是讓日本人越來越怕。日本對中共的金援有目共睹,日本對中共投入的資金雖然龐大,但是中共對人民反日仇美的情緒,卻有意無意的加以鼓舞,其運作人民力量的同時,也放縱經濟特區可以適當的哈日、哈美,但是在意識衝突時全國的仇恨情緒,立刻可以即時挑動,成為全國運動,以此來挾迫美國、日本做出讓步,故終得以解放軍來防患不可收拾的民運,這是中共民氣操作的手法,其彈性運作北韓尚無法跟的上。

  參考美國傳統基金會的報導:

 

Joining Forces Against Terrorism:
Japan's New Law Commits More Than Words to U.S. Effort

The Heritage Foundation
BY Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D.
November 5, 2001


Japan gave its ally, the United States, a strong show of support in the war on terrorism by passing a significant Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29. This new law will enable Japan to "contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of terrorism." By moving beyond the country's prior policy of non-involvement, the law will allow Japan's self-defense forces (SDF) to support the efforts of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The SDF would be able to use their weapons not only to protect themselves, but also to protect "others who are on the scene and have come under their (SDF) control while conducting their duties."

For example, under this new law, Japan's ships, even Aegis destroyers, could be deployed to the Persian Gulf to become part of the U.S. air defense umbrella, ready to use their missiles to defend U.S. forces should they come under attack. This move, welcomed by the United States, also has been welcomed by Australia and Singapore, both of which offered the use of their naval facilities to Japanese ships in transit to the front.

In framing the significance of anti-terrorism legislation, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi emphasized that Japan should begin to take a "proactive" stance in trying to eradicate terrorism. For Japan, this new approach means the Diet must amend the laws governing the self-defense forces and the Maritime Safety Agency. For Asia and the rest of the world, it means that Japan, while maintaining its "peace constitution," would take a significant step toward becoming a more active international power that will contribute to other defense actions or international efforts under U.N. mandates. For the United States, it means that Japan continues to uphold their long-standing alliance as especially important in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world.

The Bush Administration should welcome this assistance from a strong ally. There will be some concerns around Asia that Japan may be abandoning its "peace constitution." Therefore, the Administration should support Japan through active diplomacy around the Asia-Pacific region and through its own "proactive" public diplomacy program. Finally, when Japan's self-defense forces do deploy, they should be fully integrated into the defense architecture in regions where the war on terrorism is being waged.

Japan's New Role in Preserving Peace

Japan's defense activities are severely circumscribed by Article 9 of its Constitution, which states that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." It also asserts that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential" to accomplish such aims "will never be maintained." As Heritage analyst Balbina Hwang has observed, "while Japan's Constitution does not explicitly prohibit collective self-defense actions, Japan's non-involvement in such activities has been the accepted interpretation of Article 9 since its adoption in 1947."

Former Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, now head of the prestigious Tokyo think tank, the Okazaki Institute, has observed that "Japan has the right of collective self-defense, but it is a right that Japan will not exercise" because of public opposition. The practical effect of this restrictive interpretation of Article 9 has been to limit logistical support from Japan in peacekeeping operations and in maneuvers with the United States that involve joint exercises.

Describing the operative effects of that interpretation of Article 9 in a speech at the Atlantic Council in Washington last July, Okazaki noted that if a U.S. warship conducting exercises in the Sea of Japan were attacked by enemy fire, the Japanese self-defense forces would be prohibited from coming to its aid. Yet, if a Japanese ship involved in the exercises were attacked by enemy fire, the United States would be obligated under its bilateral treaty alliance to assist Japan.

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed by the Diet is consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution because, while it permits logistical and other support, it does not permit Japanese forces to participate in direct offensive combat. Implicit in the new law is the assumption that Japanese ships could engage in defensive actions with the U.S. Navy in the event of attack. By passing the anti-terrorism law, permitting Japan's self-defense forces to deploy to the Persian Gulf, the Diet has greatly aided Prime Minister Koizumi's effort to develop a new consensus in Japan on collective self-defense.

Since he became Prime Minister on April 26, Koizumi has sought such a consensus that would permit at least an early reinterpretation of Article 9 to facilitate stronger alliance cooperation with the United States. His long-term goal is to make Japan a more "normal" power with a stronger defensive capability, and he has been encouraged to do this by many foreign policy experts in the Bush Administration and around the United States. Until the terrorist attacks on September 11, Koizumi and his allies used the need for ballistic missile defense cooperation to advance this effort. The attacks on the United States propelled the political consensus in Japan that he sought. A survey by the respected Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun found that 83 percent of respondents support or accept the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign, which is widely viewed as a defensive action.

A Critical Reinterpretation of Japan's Constitution

Japan's right to collective self-defense is not explicitly denied by its Constitution. Rather it is denied by a 1960 government interpretation of Article 9, the result of heightened expectations of a Soviet invasion of the island of Hokkaido. But this restrictive interpretation has burned itself into the public consciousness to the point that it has carried the strength of dogma. Indeed, it is one of the reasons political limitations were imposed on the breadth of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense.

Reluctance in Japan to establish a robust defense establishment dates back to 1954, when the National Police Reserves and National Security Force were renamed the Self-Defense Forces. The Japanese Defense Agency was also created at that time, with ground, maritime, and air self-defense components. The major factor reorienting Japan's defense policy, to the alarm of many East Asian nations who recalled Japan's wartime history, was a communique issued by President Ronald Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki on May 8, 1981. It acknowledged that "both countries desire a greater sharing of defense roles and thus, Japan should increase its defense capabilities...." From a practical standpoint, this meant that Japan would defend Japanese territory and the seas and skies surrounding Japan up to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles, something that the United States had promoted for some time.

Since then, the political climate in Japan limited further expansion of this defense role, including the participation of the SDF in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In the Gulf War, Japan contributed $13 billion and six minesweepers, but no real military support. Despite pressure from a small number of conservative Diet members for a reinterpretation of Article 9, there has been little movement to do so until now. The release of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 after the September attacks on America, which calls on countries worldwide to "redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation," provided Koizumi and the Diet the legislative opportunity to reinterpret the Constitution so as to be able to dispatch forces in support of the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.

A U.S. Response to Japan's New Law

The Bush Administration should publicly acknowledge this show of support from Japan. Specifically, it should:

  • Encourage Japan to continue pursuing a posture of collective self-defense . Washington can do this by ensuring that the SDF ships and personnel Japan deploys to participate in the war on terrorism are fully integrated into U.S. defensive formations.
  • Using public diplomacy, make clear that the United States welcomes Japan's efforts to be a more "normal" world power, which would help strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Public diplomacy programs should also emphasize that this is not a move toward militarism on the part of Japan.
  • Work to strengthen other forms of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation , such as sea-based ballistic missile defense research. This is a major interest of Japan because of the growing threat of missile attack posed by North Korea's aggressive ballistic missile program.

Conclusion

The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by Japan's Diet is a strong show of support for the United States in conducting a global war on terrorism. It also signals Asia and the world that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong. The United States should publicly acknowledge this step by pointing out the contributions Japan can make to peace and security not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also around the world, by providing defensive support for its ally.

--Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D., is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.


 

 

簡錫出新書 「無悔」揭秘辛

中國時報 91/01/20


 林照真/台北報導 美國「九一一」恐怖攻擊事件令全世界同聲譴責暴力行徑,剛卸下立委職務的簡錫在即將出版的新書中,首度透露台灣在國民黨威權統治末期,黨外秘密策畫進行的恐怖反抗行動。簡錫指出,當時在海外廣為流傳的《都市游擊戰》手冊,其實是一套完整的恐怖教戰守則;台灣也曾經秘密訓練學員製造韓國的汽油彈,並且在陳婉真抗議行動中派上用場。

 簡錫在他即將出版的新書《無悔》,劇變年代的行動者中談到這段往事坦言,他曾積極訓練一些激進份子來對抗國民黨的威權統治。他看到一些親身經歷二二八事件的老人常聚集在龍山寺,很多黨外活動也在龍山寺舉辦,簡錫便煽動龍山寺的老人,讓他們每次上街頭時都排在最前面,以暴力方式對抗鎮暴部隊。

 簡錫提到,一九八八年時有人在農運丟了兩顆汽油彈,一下子群眾的氣勢就起來了,人人都覺得他很有膽量。後來他與鄭南榕等一些朋友還商量準備弄一個秘密組織,專門針對國民黨特務機關做破壞行動,不過最後因故並沒有付諸實現。

 一九八六年時,簡錫從美國的台灣同鄉手上拿到《都市游擊戰》的小冊子,這是許信良和史明在海外宣揚無產階級革命與城市游擊戰的宣傳品,在台灣海外同鄉手上廣為流傳與討論。簡錫說,手冊上還有很多圖解,說明如何製造與安裝爆裂物,以及進行都市游擊戰的要領,簡直就是一套完整的恐怖活動教戰守則。雖然這本冊子無法帶回台灣,但如何製造爆裂物的內容與步驟都詳細列在簡錫的腦海中。

 一九八七年簡錫在台灣一次秘密的訓練營中,首次教導學員如何製造韓國式的汽油彈。但簡錫指出,當時他們並沒有使用這些技巧,不過這些學員很快都成為台獨基本教義派的激進份子。

 一九八七年末,當時的台獨聯盟主席林哲夫從加拿大引進一套不同於韓國的運動模式「UR M」(城鄉宣教組織),URM大力倡導「愛與非暴力」的抗爭理念,簡錫受到影響,而改變了之前的路線主張。


 

 

簡錫 思考不同熱情如一

中國時報 � 91/01/20


 林照真/特稿 剛卸下立委職務的簡錫決定盡全力倡導和平運動,這與他昔日打算以汽油彈推翻國民黨政權的想法大不相同。過去的簡錫曾經主張以暴力方式向國民黨威權進行武裝對抗,現在的簡錫卻成立「台灣和平基金會」,致力於兩岸和平運動。

 有人笑他由獨派到統派,要開始討好中國;有人說他只是弱小的台灣人,那有能力向中國要求和平?簡錫從台灣武裝暴力到推動兩岸和平運動,是一段難以為外人道的心路歷程。

 簡錫了解到,昔日他主張武裝對抗暴力時,安全感是建立在手中的武器上。而非暴力需要的是勇氣,是發自內心對不公義的對抗,並且要用和平的方式化解衝突,於是他回過頭來反省曾經嚮往的韓國激進運動。

 後來簡錫把所學到的「愛與非暴力」抗爭模式首次用在「一○○行動聯盟」上,亦在工運上大加應用。近年更積極推動兩岸和平運動。簡錫因此遭到不少譏笑;有人認為他已經背離台獨立場變成統派,要開始討好中國,向中國乞求和平。

 對於外界的質疑,簡錫並不感到意外。他認為,化解兩岸敵對仇恨應該從台灣做起,台灣既然無論編列多少國防預算,都無法有效抵禦中共強大的軍事武力,為什麼不多花點錢消除雙方的誤解與仇恨?而和平正是兩岸要追求的最大公約數。

 簡錫放棄從政之路,決心為陷入僵局的兩岸和平奉獻後半生,台灣首次由簡錫口中向中國政權喊出「和平非暴力」訴求,但流亡印度的西藏政教領袖達賴喇嘛為求和談,提倡非暴力抗爭已數十年,中共卻仍然不為所動。對照流亡藏人慘痛的經驗,台灣要向北京當局高喊和平,恐怕需要更周密的論辯,簡錫熱情不減當年,但挑戰將更艱巨。

  簡錫的心路歷程,輕估中共的態度與理念,中共對台並沒良性互動,大國對小台灣的不能容,而台灣處處讓步,到後來就是吃定台灣軟腳蝦,中共如果是可以談的對象,中共會以大國之尊向台灣示好,可是中共的做法並非如此,中共面對台灣參予全球化的民主大林,不但無孔不入的打壓,還以選擇性分化來統戰台灣,台灣就因為有這些分不清事實是非的政客作祟(非指簡錫),一再讓中共有機可乘。