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Sad fate on April 19, 2004 ……
How Taiwan can avoid Hong Kong's sad fate
By Li Thian-hok
When Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997, China promised the Special Administrative Region a high level of autonomy except in foreign affairs and national defense. Hong Kong was to retain its free market economy and its way of life for 50 years. Under Hong Kong's Basic Law, two democratic reforms were implicitly promised: the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage after 2007, and an increase in the number of seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) elected by the people after 2008.
On April 6, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress issued a binding interpretation of the Basic Law that it alone had the authority to determine the content and timing of any reform amendments. Hong Kong's leading pro-democracy lawmaker, Martin Lee, commented, "No freedom is safe because every clause in the Basic Law is subject to interpretation by the Standing Committee."
Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" principle has always been a rather misleading concept. The Basic Law was formulated to promote stability -- not democratic rule -- by concentrating power in the chief executive and the civil service and diluting the authority of LegCo. Democratic reforms were to be permitted only in incremental steps. But now, the prospects for democratic reform have become dim. In the next LegCo election in September, directly elected candidates will occupy half the chamber. But Beijing has threatened to dissolve the legislature if the pro-Beijing "patriots" do not retain control.
Beijing's recent action to forestall democratic reform and Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's attempt last year to enact the controversial "anti-subversion law," based on Article 23 of the Basic Law, clearly demonstrate Beijing's fear of democracy. China's management of "one country, two systems" since 1997 in relation to Hong Kong indicates that the democratization of China, if it is possible at all, will be in the distant future. With its clean bureaucracy, independent and fair judiciary and relatively free flow of information, Hong Kong is an ideal setting for an experiment in Chinese democracy. If democracy cannot germinate on such rich soil, there is no chance that it can grow in China proper, which lacks the infrastructure of a pluralistic, civic society.
There are, no doubt, some Taiwanese who would seriously consider unification with China once it evolved into a fully democratic country. There are US policymakers who support Taiwan's de facto independence from China but only until China becomes a democracy. The lesson from Hong Kong is that democracy in China is a pipe dream as long as the Chinese Communist Party is in control.
In contrast to Hong Kong, Taiwan has a great opportunity to develop its democracy. It has a brighter future than Hong Kong because it is different in several ways. Hong Kong has to rely on China for water and food. It has no choice but to become a part of China. Taiwan is a prosperous island, protected by the Taiwan Strait. It has the resources to be an independent nation. Hong Kong was ceded to Britain by an "unequal" treaty. Even those Hong Kong people who dislike Chinese rule would agree that Hong Kong's reversion to China was appropriate.
Taiwan was ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan in 1895. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, but no recipient was named. According to the principle of self-determination, only Taiwan's people can decide their future status.
The residents of Hong Kong are mainly Han people. The great majority of Taiwanese are a mixture of Chinese and Aboriginal people of Austronesian extraction.
The people of Hong Kong regard themselves as Chinese. The great majority of Taiwanese people identify themselves as Taiwanese. Only 10 percent call themselves "Chinese." The rise of this national consciousness is due to a unique history and a struggle to achieve Taiwan's "economic miracle" and democratization of a once-autocratic political system.
Taiwan is capable of defending its sovereignty, and now that it is a democracy, it has the support of fellow democracies, particularly the US and Japan, in continuing as a de facto independent nation.
To maintain the status quo, however, the newly reelected Democratic Progressive Party administration must carry out three crucial tasks: stem growing economic dependence on China, bolster Taiwan's national defense -- in terms of both hardware and building a national will to preserve freedom -- and improve relations with the US by fostering mutual trust. The work will be hard but necessary if Taiwan does not wish to become a second Hong Kong.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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On April 19, 2004 ……
China 'interprets' HK law to death
`Beijing has taken away the right to instigate reform and strengthened its own role in the decision-making process. The people may be able to discuss political reform, but what good will it actually do? Beijing is sure to say no.'
By Paul Lin
A new interpretation of Hong Kong's Basic Law was ratified on April 6 in meetings of the 10th National People's Congress Central Standing Committee (CSC) in Beijing.
With 155 votes for the motion and one abstention, this kind of landslide victory with nary a peep of disagreement is the preserve of a totalitarian government, and clearly demonstrates that the committee's loyalties lie with the party, not the people. This phenomenon fuels the people's calls for democracy, and explains these leaders' complete inability to understand them.
Hence we have the new "interpretation," the second time that the Central Standing Committee has shed such new light on the Basic Law.
The first came in 1999, after a clause in the Basic Law stating that children of Hong Kong citizens living abroad could claim residency caused many thousands of people to pursue legal citizenship.
Some were turned away by the authorities, either for entering the territory illegally or for overstaying. This group succeeded in overturning these rulings in the courts. After all, how could they have entered illegally or overstayed if they had already been accorded permanent residency under the Basic Law?
Given this situation, the Hong Kong government argued that over a million new residents would proceed to vie for jobs and food with other Hong Kongers. Beijing, when asked to interpret the law following public protests, reversed the original decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.
This severely compromised the Hong Kong courts' independence and opened the door for Beijing's direct manipulation of Hong Kong's laws. In the end, the individuals who lost their case for residency, the children of Hong Kong citizens, held protests against Beijing's intervention that resulted in bloodshed.
This month's second Basic Law interpretation showed either that the law Beijing itself had praised was full of loopholes, or that Beijing decided it had offered too many concessions in the past. Since Hong Kong had already been returned to China, it was time to pull things another step closer to "one country, one system." This interpretation focused on the Basic Law sections governing the Special Administrative Region leader's appointment and the Legislative Council's formation.
Yet Beijing has gone beyond interpreting the law and has actually amended it, as it increases to five the original three criteria for revisions to the Legislative Council formation law. Originally, any proposed changes needed to be passed by at least two-thirds of the council members, then approved by the chief executive and finally by the NPC Central Standing Committee. Now these stages are to be preceded by the chief executive announcing any proposed changes followed by a CSC decision.
With this, the right to instigate reforms via revision has been transferred from the council to the chief executive. If the latter decides he no longer sees the necessity for reforms, it will be very difficult for public opinion in Hong Kong to be realized. Even if the chief executive agrees to go ahead with reforms, there is the obstacle of the CSC.
Further hampering potential revisions, both the chief executive and the CSC will have the opportunity to block the process in the final two stages. Only 50 percent of the organization's members are democratically elected, and it will be extremely difficult for them to amass the required two-thirds majority.
What with the right to instigate reform in the hands of a chief executive appointed by Beijing, and the right of the unanimous CSC to veto such proposals twice in the process, any reform must pass five hurdles. This makes it next to impossible for Hong Kong's people to achieve their long-voiced dreams of democratic general elections.
Ever since Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong took responsibility for Hong Kong affairs, Beijing has been taking on a more canny, softer approach, only seemingly catering to the activists.
First, Beijing has made concessions by bringing forward electoral reforms to include the year 2007; they were originally to start after that year. This was the first consideration that they acceded to among the four points considered in the Basic Law's interpretation. The problem is that China has taken away the right to instigate reform and strengthened its own dominant role in the decision-making process.
The people may be able to discuss
political reform but what good will it actually do? Beijing is sure to say no.
Second, Beijing has sent officials to Hong Kong to discuss the interpretation after previously refusing any communication with the democracy movement. Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa similarly refused to deal with activists prior to last year's July 1 protest rally.
More recently the Central Government in Hong Kong's Liaison Office (formerly the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency) has made contact with the democracy movement, especially with lawyers who had won many votes for the movement in local elections. Officials sent to Hong Kong from Beijing nowadays no longer avoid contact with democratic activists.
Beijing's softer approach has fooled some observers, including members of the movement and of media sympathetic to Beijing. The majority of Hong Kong residents, however, have their eyes wide open. The April 11 protest against Beijing's interpretation of the Basic Law tells us much about how people really feel in Hong Kong.
Paul Lin is a political commentator living in the United States.
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On April 19, 2004 ……
Cheney gets ties back on track
US Vice President Dick Cheney's statements on the Taiwan issue during his visit to China signal that Taiwan-US relations are back on track after a string of aberrations caused by the referendum, election disputes and American Institute in Taiwan Chairwoman Therese Shaheen's resignation. Cheney's neutral stance helps redress US President George W. Bush's turn toward China during talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.
Although Cheney reiterated the policy that the US does not support Taiwan's independence, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo and urges cross-strait negotiations, he said for the first time that US arms sales to Taiwan are prompted by China's missiles aimed at Taiwan, adding that the US arms sales follow Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Not only were his remarks reported by China's state-run news agency but he reiterated this stance at Shanghai's Fudan University.
Cheney's China visit reflects that international relations are functioning smoothly after being distorted by the recent presidential election campaign. It further shows that Taiwan's control of the diplomatic damage wrought by the referendum and Shaheen's resignation has taken effect. Taiwan exercised damage control before Cheney's visit: former minister of foreign affairs Eugene Chien stepped down for supervisory negligence over Shaheen's departure. Chien's resignation has effectively absorbed the discord between Taiwan and the US, and is a sign that Taiwan has come out of the election uncertainty and that Taiwan-US relations have returned to a routine track.
Cheney arrived in Beijing on April 13, the day before China's Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Li Weiyi decried President Chen Shui-bian's push for a new constitution by 2006 as pushing for Taiwan's independence. Earlier, the office also called the TRA inappropriate. But this time, Cheney's actions differed from those of Bush, who echoed Wen's unfavorable remarks about Taiwan during their talk. Washington's stance has become more flexible, so it again can play the role of a mediator in cross-strait relations.
Apart from declaring that plans for US arms sales to Taiwan remain unchanged, Cheney also advised China to negotiate with Taiwan. This promotes Chen's ideas for resuming cross-strait talks after his re-election, for building a "peace and stability" framework for cross-strait interactions and for appointing a Taiwan representative to Beijing.
Cheney also called on China not to oppress freedom and democracy at home or in Hong Kong. Since the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong is a very important indicator for Taiwan, Beijing's oppression of democracy in Hong Kong will only drive Taiwan away. This was the first time a US leader had officially commented on the relationships among Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. His straight talk in the face of Chinese pressure tallied with the basic US principle of safeguarding freedom and democracy, and was highly praised by activists in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Cheney's China visit was a successful one that had a symbolic diplomatic meaning. It highlighted Sino-US relations as a strategic partnership without sacrificing basic values, and saved the host country's face without hurting either Taiwan's security or Hong Kong's democracy. Most importantly, Cheney's state visit to China created maneuvering room for future cross-strait relations between Taiwan's presidential race and the upcoming US election.
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