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Chen’s leadership on May 1, 2004 ……

 

Evaluating Chen's leadership

 

While most recent attention has focused on what messages President Chen Shui-bian will deliver in his inaugural speech on May 20, few reports have seriously addressed how Chen will remold his leadership for the tremendous challenges of his second term.

 

How should we anticipate this "A-bian era"? Can Chen continue to build his leadership based on democratic principles and decisive actions?

 

That Chen garnered over half the popular vote is indisputable. The question now is how he will manage this new mandate in accordance with public expectations and translate his campaign messages into concrete actions.

 

A political leader should monitor the pulse of the times in which he lives. He need not mute his desire for change or modify his ideas, but he must make sure his style matches the public's mood.

 

The election showed that Chen and his government have been in line with the mainstream public opinion in terms of promoting national identity. Further, the returns imply that over 50 percent of voters trust that Chen will continue reforms in political institutions, crime-fighting, education and economic rejuvenation.

 

With such a mandate, Chen need not limit his goals. However, he must skillfully lower his voice, bend his knees and take smaller steps. After all, the razor-thin victory reveals a divided society. How to regain the public's trust in his leadership and in the government will be one of Chen's challenges.

 

A smart leader should realize when the national mood has changed. Exhausted by partisan disputes, ethnic divisions and extremism on both sides of the unification-independence dichotomy, the country wants political leaders to resolve their differences.

 

Therefore, learning how to be both a "bargaining" president and an "action" president will be the key to Chen's success in the next four years.

 

To fulfill his pledges, Chen must build a clear strategy for implementing them. He must accelerate his proposals to establish task forces to reduce ethnic divisions, and must maintain peaceful and stable interactions with China.

 

To bridge partisan differences and pursue political reconciliation with the opposition, Chen should follow a strategy of persuasion and bargaining to seek common ground on key policies.

 

Even the year-end legislative election might inhibit constructive cooperation between political parties. Chen needs to continue to serve as a father figure to help the public learn that the country faces both domestic and international difficulties. The extent to which political parties can put aside their differences and work together for the common people's good will determine the nation's future.

 

The power to negotiate determines whether Chen should be aggressive or conciliatory in promoting his policies. When he speaks out boldly to set an agenda for constitutional revision by 2006, should he focus on incremental change rather than radical adjustments? Is it time to run up the flag and charge, or to mediate differences and seek to move the consensus by stages?

 

Chen must act like a CEO who insists on tough discipline among his team, for the partially reorganized Cabinet acts as his policy executor. There is no room for the administration to repeat its mistakes.

 

Chen should keep in mind that politicians do not just need public support to win elections; they need it to govern. A politician needs a permanent campaign to keep a permanent majority, but this goal does not mean abandoning principle. It means caring enough about how you explain yourself to get the nation solidly behind you.

 

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On May 1, 2004 ……

 

US words reflect long-term change

 

By Paul Lin

Taiwan-US relations have once again grabbed media attention. Yet contrary to some reports, recent remarks by US officials were not aimed at dissuading President Chen Shui-bian from claiming Taiwan independence upon his re-election.

 

Instead, these remarks were made in a particular context: a US congressional hearing on the Taiwan Relations Act's (TRA) first 25 years, an occasion where US officials had to address this complex issue. Several seminars on these issues were also held at around the same time, thereby heating up the topic.

 

Yet these remarks represented no change in the underlying Taiwan-US relationship. The State Department attaches more importance to the practical interests of the US, while the Congress stresses US popular sentiment. Despite different views taken by the State Department and the Pentagon, the difference is not yet huge in general.

 

The hearing was held just after the presidential election. The US was concerned with the decision to hold referendums before the election. After the election, there were rumors surrounding American Institute in Taiwan Chairwoman Therese Shaheen's resignation.

 

These factors complicated Taiwan-US relations, but much more important changes in cross-strait relations have taken place over 25 years.

 

These changes include Beijing's leadership reshuffle last year and Taiwan's elections, but also China's greater flexibility on anti-terrorism efforts and economic issues, a policy intended to rope in the US to act against Taiwan. China has accelerated its military preparations against Taiwan and used these to intimidate the US. And Taiwan has deepened its democracy and increased its national consciousness and resistance to the idea of "one China."

 

In light of these changes, both officials and academics naturally have developed new perspectives on the cross-strait relationship.

 

Washington now understands that it would not be able to keep out of a war if China attacks Taiwan. Worried that Beijing may react irrationally to Taiwan's proposals for referendums and a new constitution, the Bush administration needs to repeatedly remind Taiwan, sometimes with harsh rhetoric, of the risks that accompany these actions.

 

Yet the US also increases its arms sales and military cooperation with Taiwan in view of China's growing military threat. Military expert Richard Fisher even suggested that Washington sell offensive weapons to Taiwan as one concrete measure to deter Chinese military operations against Taiwan. The US also strengthened its military deployment in the Pacific, reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act.

 

Beijing insists that the three joint communiques it signed with the US govern Sino-US relations. The Chinese government interprets the US understanding of one China as a recognition of one China, and its stance of not supporting Taiwan independence as opposition to it.

 

Because of his understanding of Beijing's arbitrary thuggishness, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly was denying Beijing's monopoly on interpreting cross-strait relations, recognizing that China could attack Taiwan simply because it says Taiwan is declaring independence. Beijing's interpretation of the status quo is different from that of the US and Taiwan. China not only steps up war preparations to alter the status quo but also actively uses propaganda to achieve reunification.

 

Taiwan's democratization challenges the three communiques signed by Washington and Beijing. The Shanghai Communique signed in 1972 stated that "the US acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." But how could all Chinese express their views when both sides still endured authoritarian regimes? At least since Taiwan's democratization, many Taiwanese do not identify themselves as Chinese, nor do they recognize Taiwan as part of "one China."

 

During his visit to Singapore, US Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Daley said that Washington does not oppose Taiwan or China changing the status quo, but any change has to be peaceful and requires the consent of both sides.

 

People in Taiwan can express their consent or disapproval in referendums. But China is not allowed to change the status quo before the mechanism of referendums is made available to Chinese people. Therefore, the US should warn China against attacking Taiwan as well as seeking rapid political unification.

 

Provided that the US can base its new decisions on the new circumstances, the US spirit can truly prosper in the world and the long-term instability in the Taiwan Strait can be resolved.

 

Paul Lin is a commentator based in New York.

 

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